Politics

“Today is a dark day for international criminal justice,” said Fatou Bensouda, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), as she reluctantly withdrew the charges against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta last Friday. Bensouda was given little choice in the matter. Struggling to collect evidence, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) had asked the judges of the ICC to adjourn the case. The OTP requested a pause in proceedings until investigators could come up with stronger evidence or the Kenyan government could be persuaded to co-operate fully. The court denied this request, asking the prosecution to indicate whether it could proceed under the circumstances or alternatively, drop the matter altogether. Aware she did not have enough evidence for a conviction, Bensouda took the latter route. “The withdrawal of the charges does not mean the case has been permanently terminated. Mr Kenyatta has not been acquitted and the case can be re-opened, or brought in a different form, if new evidence establishing the crimes and his responsibility for them is discovered,” she said.

There are no positives to be taken from the end result, however. For the prosecution and the ICC, it’s a devastating blow to their credibility. Critics of the ICC, and there are many, will use the collapse of the case against Kenyatta as a powerful example to again question the court’s competence and its motives. Supporters of the ICC will be even more disheartened. The reason the prosecution went ahead was that there was a strong prima facie case implicating Kenyatta in Kenya’s horrific post-election violence in 2007 to 2008. To prove this beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution needed investigators to find some new evidence, witnesses to testify to Kenyatta’s role and co-operation from the Kenyan government, which included sharing key financial documents that might have implicated the accused. It failed on all three fronts. The overstretched and under-resourced ICC investigative unit was also hamstrung by bureaucratic operating protocols (which require, for example, governments under investigation to be informed in advance of the presence of the investigators). Some witnesses died or went missing, while others refused to testify out of fear or suddenly changed their testimony without explanation.

This points to a sustained campaign of intimidation against witnesses, while few trusted the ICC’s guarantees of protection. The Kenyan government, meanwhile, failed repeatedly to hand over the full list of documents requested by the prosecution and the court was unable to force the co-operation it demanded. The prosecution’s struggles illustrate the difficulties, or even the limits, of international justice. Ultimately, prosecuting Kenyatta required far too much active co-operation from Kenyatta himself – who, as sitting president of Kenya, was perfectly positioned to frustrate the proceedings. But perhaps the most damaging aspect of the collapse of the case is Kenyatta has demonstrated to others exactly how to beat ICC charges. Thanks to Kenyatta, there is now a proven template for evading international justice. The first stage in Kenyatta’s defence began far away from the courtroom in The Hague, on the Kenyan campaign trail. When he was charged in 2012 with crimes against humanity, Kenyatta was deputy prime minister in the government of national unity. After the 2013 election he became president. Arguably the ICC charges – which he portrayed as victimisation – actually helped his campaign, as did his political alliance with another ICC accused, William Ruto. (Incidentally, Ruto and Kenyatta were on opposing sides during the 2007 to 2008 post-election violence, and Ruto remains on trial at the ICC.)

Once in power, Kenyatta was able to rally the full weight of the Kenyan government to his cause. This helped him in two ways. First, the issue of co-operation. Kenyatta’s legal team repeatedly denied the president had influenced the relationship between the ICC and the Kenyan government, pointing to the separation of powers in the Kenyan constitution and the independence of various government bodies. This was disingenuous. In Kenya, power flows directly from State House and it would take an exceptionally brave public official to hand over anything that might incriminate the head of state. The deaths and disappearance of witnesses underscored the danger. While there is no evidence suggesting Kenyatta was personally involved in the campaign of intimidation, it’s undeniable his defence was greatly strengthened by it, suggesting that whoever did orchestrate it was doing so to benefit the president. It is also surely no coincidence that no one has been arrested or charged in connection with witness intimidation. Second was the diplomatic offensive. In every conceivable forum, from the Rome Statute annual Assembly of States Parties to the African Union summit, Kenyan diplomats sought to criticise and undermine the ICC. They were particularly successful in depicting the court as biased against Africans, even persuading African leaders to issue a strong statement of condemnation at an extraordinary summit to discuss the ICC cases. This put the court under huge pressure and also bolstered Kenyatta’s public image.

Instead of an alleged international criminal, Kenyatta was able to portray himself as yet another African victim of a racist western institution. This image generated plenty of solidarity and shielded Kenyatta from continental pressure to co-operate fully (or the imposition of sanctions, such as a travel ban, to that effect).
In the end, this was a perfect defence, as the withdrawal of charges proves. Unfortunately, the message it sends to other suspects under investigation by the ICC is that one way to beat the court is by taking control of the state. This raises yet another difficult paradox for the ICC to grapple with: indirectly, its efforts could encourage some of the world’s most dangerous men to seek more power, not less. But the biggest losers in all of this remain, of course, the more than 20 000 victims of Kenya’s post-election violence for whom justice is still far away. “Seven years ago, tens of thousands of people in Naivasha and Nakuru were targeted for no reason other than their ethnic identity. Men were beheaded in the streets. Human heads were paraded on sticks. Women were serially raped and then doused in paraffin and set alight. Children were burnt alive. Houses and tiny business premises were pillaged and destroyed in their thousands,” explained Fergal Gaynor, legal representative for the victims at the ICC. ‘It is regrettable the victims have received almost nothing from the entire ICC process. The victims’ quest for justice has been cruelly frustrated, both in Kenya and at the ICC,” he concluded.

Culled from Defence Web

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Ngwa Bertrand

11.Dec.2014

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“Today is a dark day for international criminal justice,” said Fatou Bensouda, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), as she reluctantly withdrew the charges against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta last Friday. Bensouda was given little choice in the matter. Struggling to collect evidence, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) had asked the judges of the ICC to adjourn the case. The OTP requested a pause in proceedings until investigators could come up with stronger evidence or the Kenyan government could be persuaded to co-operate fully. The court denied this request, asking the prosecution to indicate whether it could proceed under the circumstances or alternatively, drop the matter altogether. Aware she did not have enough evidence for a conviction, Bensouda took the latter route. “The withdrawal of the charges does not mean the case has been permanently terminated. Mr Kenyatta has not been acquitted and the case can be re-opened, or brought in a different form, if new evidence establishing the crimes and his responsibility for them is discovered,” she said.

There are no positives to be taken from the end result, however. For the prosecution and the ICC, it’s a devastating blow to their credibility. Critics of the ICC, and there are many, will use the collapse of the case against Kenyatta as a powerful example to again question the court’s competence and its motives. Supporters of the ICC will be even more disheartened. The reason the prosecution went ahead was that there was a strong prima facie case implicating Kenyatta in Kenya’s horrific post-election violence in 2007 to 2008. To prove this beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution needed investigators to find some new evidence, witnesses to testify to Kenyatta’s role and co-operation from the Kenyan government, which included sharing key financial documents that might have implicated the accused. It failed on all three fronts. The overstretched and under-resourced ICC investigative unit was also hamstrung by bureaucratic operating protocols (which require, for example, governments under investigation to be informed in advance of the presence of the investigators). Some witnesses died or went missing, while others refused to testify out of fear or suddenly changed their testimony without explanation.

This points to a sustained campaign of intimidation against witnesses, while few trusted the ICC’s guarantees of protection. The Kenyan government, meanwhile, failed repeatedly to hand over the full list of documents requested by the prosecution and the court was unable to force the co-operation it demanded. The prosecution’s struggles illustrate the difficulties, or even the limits, of international justice. Ultimately, prosecuting Kenyatta required far too much active co-operation from Kenyatta himself – who, as sitting president of Kenya, was perfectly positioned to frustrate the proceedings. But perhaps the most damaging aspect of the collapse of the case is Kenyatta has demonstrated to others exactly how to beat ICC charges. Thanks to Kenyatta, there is now a proven template for evading international justice. The first stage in Kenyatta’s defence began far away from the courtroom in The Hague, on the Kenyan campaign trail. When he was charged in 2012 with crimes against humanity, Kenyatta was deputy prime minister in the government of national unity. After the 2013 election he became president. Arguably the ICC charges – which he portrayed as victimisation – actually helped his campaign, as did his political alliance with another ICC accused, William Ruto. (Incidentally, Ruto and Kenyatta were on opposing sides during the 2007 to 2008 post-election violence, and Ruto remains on trial at the ICC.)

Once in power, Kenyatta was able to rally the full weight of the Kenyan government to his cause. This helped him in two ways. First, the issue of co-operation. Kenyatta’s legal team repeatedly denied the president had influenced the relationship between the ICC and the Kenyan government, pointing to the separation of powers in the Kenyan constitution and the independence of various government bodies. This was disingenuous. In Kenya, power flows directly from State House and it would take an exceptionally brave public official to hand over anything that might incriminate the head of state. The deaths and disappearance of witnesses underscored the danger. While there is no evidence suggesting Kenyatta was personally involved in the campaign of intimidation, it’s undeniable his defence was greatly strengthened by it, suggesting that whoever did orchestrate it was doing so to benefit the president. It is also surely no coincidence that no one has been arrested or charged in connection with witness intimidation. Second was the diplomatic offensive. In every conceivable forum, from the Rome Statute annual Assembly of States Parties to the African Union summit, Kenyan diplomats sought to criticise and undermine the ICC. They were particularly successful in depicting the court as biased against Africans, even persuading African leaders to issue a strong statement of condemnation at an extraordinary summit to discuss the ICC cases. This put the court under huge pressure and also bolstered Kenyatta’s public image.

Instead of an alleged international criminal, Kenyatta was able to portray himself as yet another African victim of a racist western institution. This image generated plenty of solidarity and shielded Kenyatta from continental pressure to co-operate fully (or the imposition of sanctions, such as a travel ban, to that effect).
In the end, this was a perfect defence, as the withdrawal of charges proves. Unfortunately, the message it sends to other suspects under investigation by the ICC is that one way to beat the court is by taking control of the state. This raises yet another difficult paradox for the ICC to grapple with: indirectly, its efforts could encourage some of the world’s most dangerous men to seek more power, not less. But the biggest losers in all of this remain, of course, the more than 20 000 victims of Kenya’s post-election violence for whom justice is still far away. “Seven years ago, tens of thousands of people in Naivasha and Nakuru were targeted for no reason other than their ethnic identity. Men were beheaded in the streets. Human heads were paraded on sticks. Women were serially raped and then doused in paraffin and set alight. Children were burnt alive. Houses and tiny business premises were pillaged and destroyed in their thousands,” explained Fergal Gaynor, legal representative for the victims at the ICC. ‘It is regrettable the victims have received almost nothing from the entire ICC process. The victims’ quest for justice has been cruelly frustrated, both in Kenya and at the ICC,” he concluded.

Culled from Defence Web

Details

Ngwa Bertrand

11.Dec.2014

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Boko Haram militants have murdered 5 people late last night in the village of Yegoua deep down the district of Mora in the Far North Region. The terrorists who carried out the action entered the locality on grounds that they wanted to refuel their vehicle. The Cameroon army is reportedly changing its strategy in dealing with foreign vehicles coming into Yegoua.

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Ngwa Bertrand

10.Dec.2014

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Cameroon military has announced that it intercepted a supply convoy refueling Boko Haram militants operating in the Far North Region of the country. The Boko Haram convoy of vehicles that carried heavy ammunition were also loaded with cattle and horses heading to Fotokol. The Cameroon intelligence operation also saw the capturing of two Boko Haram commanders operating in the North of the country.  

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Ngwa Bertrand

09.Dec.2014

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By Julius A. Agbor, PhD

The Biya government recently passed a bill through the lower chamber of parliament instituting the death penalty on anyone guilty of terrorism. Article 2(1) of the law defines terrorism as any act or threat with consequence being death, bodily or material harm to humans and the environment alike. Falling within the scope of terrorism are all acts undertaken with the aim of intimidating the population, instigating fear, or coercing the victim, the government or national and international organizations to take certain actions or renounce from taking a particular position. The law also characterizes as terrorism, any attempt to disrupt the normal functioning of public services as well as any attempt to incite general uprising among the population.

There are three crucial problems with this law. The first is that it terrorizes the Cameroonian people in that the scope of what is considered terrorism clearly encroaches into the domain of individual liberties and expression. If Cameroon is a democracy, then its citizens have the right to use every peaceful means of expression, including popular uprising, to coerce its government to go in a particular direction. This law forbids that by pronouncing the death penalty on anyone caught instigating Cameroonians to rise up against the government. While most Cameroonians agree on the need to stamp out terror and its perpetrators from the national perimeters, we need to agree on how to go about that. Mr. Biya with his rubber stamp legislature should not have abrogated to themselves, the right to choose the methods of dealing with this worldwide phenomenon.  My sense is that Mr. Biya, as cynical as he is, is taking advantage of the present dispensation to legally outlaw protests and potential acts of insurrection.

The second issue is that, Mr. Biya failed to engage the broader Cameroonian fabric (civil society, religious groups and the academia) in discussions on a crucial topicas this and a referendum would have been warranted given the gravity of the sanctions suggested (which are now law).  That again suggests that Mr. Biya is not acting in the best interest of Cameroonians but is rather seeking to eternalize his grip on power. The third issue is that Mr. Biya’s government lacks the credibility to implement this law. This is a government with a reputation for infringing civil liberties, cannibalizing opposition leaders and rigging elections. Can such a government be trusted with the will to decipher between a political opponent and a terrorist? Clearly not!

Mr. Biya and his agents must know that even if Cameroonians do not massively revolt against this law, history will judge this government,either in presence or abstentia. Further, Mr. Biya must know that by making peaceful change in Cameroon impossible, he is making violent revolution inevitable.

[1] Author is a political economist, research associate at Stellenbosch University (South Africa) and a former research fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC. Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

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Ngwa Bertrand

08.Dec.2014

Hits: 2968

By Julius A. Agbor, PhD

The Biya government recently passed a bill through the lower chamber of parliament instituting the death penalty on anyone guilty of terrorism. Article 2(1) of the law defines terrorism as any act or threat with consequence being death, bodily or material harm to humans and the environment alike. Falling within the scope of terrorism are all acts undertaken with the aim of intimidating the population, instigating fear, or coercing the victim, the government or national and international organizations to take certain actions or renounce from taking a particular position. The law also characterizes as terrorism, any attempt to disrupt the normal functioning of public services as well as any attempt to incite general uprising among the population.

There are three crucial problems with this law. The first is that it terrorizes the Cameroonian people in that the scope of what is considered terrorism clearly encroaches into the domain of individual liberties and expression. If Cameroon is a democracy, then its citizens have the right to use every peaceful means of expression, including popular uprising, to coerce its government to go in a particular direction. This law forbids that by pronouncing the death penalty on anyone caught instigating Cameroonians to rise up against the government. While most Cameroonians agree on the need to stamp out terror and its perpetrators from the national perimeters, we need to agree on how to go about that. Mr. Biya with his rubber stamp legislature should not have abrogated to themselves, the right to choose the methods of dealing with this worldwide phenomenon.  My sense is that Mr. Biya, as cynical as he is, is taking advantage of the present dispensation to legally outlaw protests and potential acts of insurrection.

The second issue is that, Mr. Biya failed to engage the broader Cameroonian fabric (civil society, religious groups and the academia) in discussions on a crucial topicas this and a referendum would have been warranted given the gravity of the sanctions suggested (which are now law).  That again suggests that Mr. Biya is not acting in the best interest of Cameroonians but is rather seeking to eternalize his grip on power. The third issue is that Mr. Biya’s government lacks the credibility to implement this law. This is a government with a reputation for infringing civil liberties, cannibalizing opposition leaders and rigging elections. Can such a government be trusted with the will to decipher between a political opponent and a terrorist? Clearly not!

Mr. Biya and his agents must know that even if Cameroonians do not massively revolt against this law, history will judge this government,either in presence or abstentia. Further, Mr. Biya must know that by making peaceful change in Cameroon impossible, he is making violent revolution inevitable.

[1] Author is a political economist, research associate at Stellenbosch University (South Africa) and a former research fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC. Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Details

Ngwa Bertrand

08.Dec.2014

Hits: 2447